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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Dr. Joseph L. Krofcheck, was named a party defendant in the 
main action herein whereby Downey State Bank, Plaintiff, foreclosed certain 
first mortgages on land owned by said defendant. The within proceeding, in 
the court below, was ancillary to said main action. 
In 1967, Appellant's predecessor, Major-Blakeney Corporation,acquired 
certain real property hereinafter identified as Parcel 12, inter alia, ex-
ecuting the aforesaid Downey Bank first mortgages in connection therewith. 
An associated company, Park City Utah Corporation, thereafter acquired said 
realty. 
In 1971, Appellant purchased said Parcel 12, and other property, from 
Park City Utah Corporation, for value, and title passed to Appellant free and 
clear of encumbrances, except for the Downey Bank mortgages. A \•Jarranty Deed 
conveyed said prooerty to Appellant on October 22, 1971. 
Over one year later, i~ November of 1972, one William S. Richards and 
his law firm recorded an attorney's lien against said Parcel 12 which then 
belonged to Aopellant, and against approximately 29 other parcels of real 
estate also purchased by Appellant in 1971, as mentioned above. 
Appellant, a California resident, held no interest in the Major-Blakeney 
Corporation, nor in Appellant's grantor, Park City Utah Corporation; and, 
Appellant had no knowledge of said lien filing, having never employed or 
otherwise associated with said ~Jilliam S. Richards or his law firm, which 
facts were known to Respondent herein. Hov1ever, Appellant was later forced 
through economic pressure to sign a written lien release schedule prepared 
by the lienor, \~illiam s. Richards and his firm, dated February 11, 1974, 
1. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on the urging of Aopellant's grantor who informed Apoellant that said 
grantor, Park City Utah Cornoration, had sought the advice of its legal 
counsel, still William S. Richards and his firm, and the lien release 
schedule was the only manner in which Appellant's land could be reliew 
of the lien burden. Said attorney's lien was intended as security for 
certain attorneys fees due from Appellant's grantor in favor of Richan 
and his firm. 
Third parties,not joined in the within ancillary proceeding below, 
obligated to make the Downey Bank mortgage payments, but without Appel' 
knowledge or notice said parties defaulted thereon. Thereupon, Downey I 
filed its foreclosure suit and summoned Appellant by a Utah newspaper: 
cation of summons, giving notice of its action to foreclose Parcel l2i 
four other parce 1 s of rea 1 property. No actua 1, persona 1 service or oti 
contact, by mail or otherwise, was made upon Appellant (a California r 
ident) until after the Sheriff's Sale covering said property, held on 
9, 1974. Later that year, Appellant sought to have said sale set asid 
the foreclosure decree vacated, the latter having been entered on Marc 
1974, all to no avail. 
In connection with Appellant's attack on said foreclosure decree a 
sale, the two purchasers at the said sale, Richard H. Ringwood and Fri 
D. Richards and Company, filed Complaints in Intervention in the main 
opposing Appellant's position and requesting that their respective Sh< 
Sale title, acquired on April 9, 1974, be, in effect, quieted; and, s< 
Intervenors further sought to have a dispute between themselves, cono 
Respondent's purported redemption of Parcel 12, adjudicated. 
2. 
-
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On April 10, 1976, after failing to prevail in his attack on the fore-
closure decree and sale thereunder, Appellant purchased a large part of 
Parcel 12, from Intervenor Richard W. Ringwood, for $50,000.00 cash. All 
other adverse claims then existing between Appellant and said Ringwood, 
were also settled, pursuant to the written agreement of sale executed on 
said date. 
On April 12, 1976, the aforementioned Complaints in Intervention were 
severed by the lower court from the main action herein; and, the claims 
made therein were established as the basis for proceeding in the severed 
action. Exhibit "B" has been annexed hereto, as a copy of the prayer from 
Respondent's Complaint in Intervention showing the nature of the subject 
matter to be determined in the severed proceeding. 
Subsequently, the Intervenors and Appellant, who had a greater interest 
in Parcel 12 at this point than Intervenor Ringwood, all filed motions for 
summary judgment in the severed proceeding. The lower court declined to rule 
on the same, but instead set the matter for trial. 
Between the time the proceeding was severed, and the time of tri a 1 , the 
Appellant was served by all the pleadings and other documentation incident 
to the severed action, whether by the Intervenors or the Court Clerk. In any 
case, Respondent- Intervenor, served Appellant with all pleadings prepared 
by it, and Appellant participated in the matter until the day of trial. 
On October 26, 1976, a trial was held by the lower court presumably to 
adjudicate the claims in and to Parcel 12. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Despite Appellant's aforesaid appearance and participation in said 
lower court proceedings prior to the date of trial, on the day of the 
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-hearing, October 26, 1976, Appellant's counsel, although ready to proce 
(Transcript: Pgs 1-2), was precluded by the court below from participat 
at said trial on the ground that Appellant "is not a proper party befor 
the court" (Transcript: Pgs 4-5); and, further, Appellant's said counse 
was not allowed to assist Intervenor Ringwood's counsel in the matter 
(Transcript: Pgs 32, 40) as previously agreed (Transcript: Pg 5, lines 
15-30). From said action by the lower court, this Appellant, Joseph L. 
Krofcheck, M.D., has taken his appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL 
Appellant asks this Honorable Supreme Court to remand the matter~ 
portedly tried by the court be 1 ow on October 26, 1976, back to the Di st 
Court with instructions that Appellant is a proper party thereto and~ 
should be penni tted to introduce competent evidence embraced by the ple 
ings, the Prior stipulation and Appellant's interest in the subject mat 
Parcel 12, the real property at issue; or, in the alternative, that thi 
judgment entered by the lower court be reversed on the basis of Intervi 
Richard W. Ringwood' s appea 1 number 15207 herein, whose position is en: 
consistent with and supportive of Appe 11 ant Joseph L. Krofcheck, hereir 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the year 1967, Major-Blakeney Corporation executed certain mort1 
in favor of Downey State Bank, plaintiff in the main action herein, in 
con nee ti on with the fonner' s purchase of a Paree 1 12, and other proper: 
Thereafter, said Parcel 12, and other land, was acquired from said mer: 
by Park City Utah Corporation. 
Later, certain litigation ensued whereby the latter cornoration ~ 
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to quiet title of said Parcel 12, and other property, through Civil No. 4143, 
in the court below.· Said court upheld Park City Utah Corporation's position, 
and partitioned said Parcel 12, inter alia, to said corporation. 
William S. Richards, and his law firm, represented said corporation in 
its effort to quiet title to said Parcel 12, and other land, in said Civil 
No. 4143 action. No attorney fees were awarded in that sµit, but the title 
acquired by said corporation was still encumbered by the Downey Bank purch-
ase money mortgages executed ori gi na lly by Major-B 1 akeney Corpora ti on (supra.). 
The total attorney fees admitted to by Richards and his law firm, in 
said Civil No. 4143 action, involving said Parcel 12, and other realty, was 
$6,000.00 due and then owing from Appellant's predecessor, Park City Utah 
Corporation, to said Richards and his firm for services rendered in said suit, 
(Record: Pg 23, Paragraph 11). 
Shortly after the final partitioning judgment in said Civil No. 4143 
action, entered on July 23, 1971, pursuant thereto William S. Richards 
executed and recorded quit claim deeds to Parcel 12, and other real estate 
covered by that judgment (Record: Pgs 35-36, Paragraphs 1-3). 
Thereafter, Appellant purchased said Parcel 12, and other property, from 
said Park City Utah Corporation. A Warranty Deed, subject only to the Downey 
Bank mortgages, conveyed fee title thereof to Appellant on October 22, 1971, 
recorded as entry 114249, Book M-33, Pa·ges 647-648, in Summit County, Utah, 
(Record: Pg 25, Paragraph 19). 
Over one year later, on rlovember 15, 1972, ~/illiam S. Richards recorded 
his notice of attorney's lien against said Parcel 12 and blanketing approx-
imately 29 other parcels (Record: Pgs 80-82), which lien purported to secure 
5. 
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-Richards' claim of approximately $39,000.00, for attorney fees incurrec 
Appellant's grantor in various lawsuits besides the aforesaid Civil No, 
action which "oroduced" Parcel 12, inter alia. Said $6,000.00 fee amour 
attributable to said latter suit was also included in the larger sum, I 
Pg 24, Paragraphs 16, 17). 
Appellant owed no part of said fees, was an innocent purchaser off 
12, for value, and had never been a client, or otherwise in a relation! 
with Richards and his law firm (Record: Pg 25, Paragraph 20). 
Later, under economic pressure due to an inability to use his prop1 
clouded by the Richards attorney's lien, Appellant confronted his gra~ 
demanding they it relieve the burden of such cloud. Hhereupon, said gn 
corporation presented Appellant with a written lien release schedule, 1 
pared by Richards and his firm who were still the grantor's attorneys, 
dated February 11, 1974, which instrument required Aooellant's acknowl 
ment thereon as to said lien release schedule. Appellant had no knowle 
of the details of Richards' fee claims, nor any liability whatever t~ 
(Record: Pg 25, Paragraph 21). 
Thereafter, the sum of $15,500.00 was paid to Richards and his fir 
(Record: Pg 25, Paragraph 18) for apolication toward releasing the r~ 
covered by the lien, although only $6,000.00 was due for the matters r 
lated to the Civil No. 4143 suit that produced the Parcel 12 and other 
tracts of land, (Record: Pg 20; Pg 26, Par. 22). 
At no time did Richards and his firm release their lien against a: 
Civil No. 4143 real property, including the subject Parcel 12, despiU 
payment of $15,500.00 (suora.) v1hen the total fee therefor was only Ii 
6. 
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(Record: Pg 26, Paragraph 22). 
Payments upon the DowneJ Bank mortgages, covering Parcel 12, and other 
property, were to be tendered by third persons who are not parties to the 
instant severed proceeding in the court below. However, the said persons 
defaulted on said payments, without Appellant's immediate knowledge (who 
resided in California), and said mortgages were foreclosed under a decree 
of the court below dated March 4, 1974, whereby Richards junior attorney's 
lien was also foreclosed. 
On April 9, 1974, Parcel 12, and other property, were sold at a Sheriff's 
Sale pursuant to the said decree of foreclosure. 
Richard ~I. Ringwood was the succesful bidder at said sale for Parcel 12, 
and Respondent acquired the remaining four oarcels offered at said sale. 
During the redemption period which fo 11 owed the sa 1 e, Respondent attemp-
ted to redeem said Parcel 12 from Ringwood, as assignee of part of the 
William S. Richards subject attorney's lien, although said lien had never 
been reduced to judgment (Record: Pgs 14-15), nor otherwise adjudicated. 
Richard VJ. Ringwood rejected said redemption effort on the part of Respondent. 
(Record: Pg 138, second paragraph). 
About the time of said redemption effort Appellant attacked the original 
foreclosure decree and sale thereunder, but did not prevail. In connection 
~1ith said attack, Ringwood and Respondent, as the judicial sale purchasers, 
filed Complaints in Intervention opposing Appellant and seeking to, in 
effect, quiet title to their respective interests in the sale properties 
and adjudicate the redemption claim of Respondent concerning Parcel 12. 
7. 
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Exhibit "B" has been attached hereto, being a copy of Respondent's pray 
from its said Complaint in Intervention, showing the nature of the su~ 
matter to be determined in the court below, since the record on appeal 
not contain all the pleadings of the main action. 
On April 10, 1976, having failed in his attack on the foreclosure c 
and sale thereunder, Appellant purchased back most of Parcel 12 from~ 
and said parties settled all other claims, inter se, in connection witl 
Parcel 12 and the litigation arising therefrom. Appellant paid said Rir 
S50,000.00 cash consideration for said interest in Parcel 12. 
On April 12, 1976, the lower court severed the claims made under ti 
Complaints in Intervention, from the main action herein (Record: Pgs ~ 
Thereafter, Respondent also sold its entire interest in the Parcel 
redemption claim, which it had previously acquired by assignment throw 
William S. Richards' attorney's lien, to parties fully outside these 
proceedings (Record: Pg 16), in, or about, the month of May, 1976. 
Subsequently, various motions, counter motions and other document 
were filed by Appellant and the said Intervenors, in the proceedings be 
(Record: Pgs 35-50). No ruling was made by the court below, on said mo 
but instead the matter was set for trial on October 26, 1976. 
During the entire tenure of said severed proceedings, until the~ 
trial, the Respondent, Intervenor Ringwood and the Court Clerk all acl 
ledged Appellant's undersigned counsel as attorney of record for Appe 1 
therein, by serving upon him, and otherwise naming him in said caoaci' 
in the records of the court below, (Record: pgs, 9, 10, 12, 13, 28, 2' 
32, 34, 52, 57, 77 and 79). Further, said record discloses Aopellant' 
8. 
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motion for summary judgment was filed shortly after these proceedings were 
severed below, with extensive affidavits and material annexed thereto, in-
dicating Appellant's clear interest in Parcel 12, and involvement with the 
subject attorney's lien upon which Respondent bases its purported redemption 
of such parcel (Record: Pgs 35-50). 
On October 26, 1976, the matter was tried, with Appellant's counsel pres-
ent but unable to proceed on Appellant's behalf by reason of the lower 
court's ruling that Appellant v1as not a proper party (Transcript: Pg 5). 
From said ruling, Appellant has taken his appeal herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: UNDER THE FACTS AND LAW OF THIS CASE, APPELLANT IS CLEARLY A 
PROPER PARTY. 
By way of a factual summary of Appellant's involement herein, the 
following outline condenses and confirms his unbroken interest in Parcel 12: 
1 .) Over one year prior to the recording of Respondent's subject lien 
Appellant, as a bona fide innocent purchaser for value acquired fee title 
to Parcel 12, on October 22, 1971; 
2.) Appellant signed his acknowledgement on the original lien release 
schedule prepared by William S. Richards' finn, the lienor, which document 
fanned a substantial part of Respondent's evidence-in-chief below, (Record: 
Pgs 83-88; Respondent's Trial Exhibit No. 2); 
3.) Although never personally notified by mail or served with summons, 
Appellant, a California resident was made a party defendant to the main 
action herein; 
4.). Appellant later aopeared in said main action with a motion to vacate 
the default decree and set aside the Sheriff's Sale of Aoril 9, 1974; 
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5.) Failing in his lower court attack·on the decree and sale, on Ap~ 
10, 1976, Appellant purchased back a large portion of Parcel 12 from the 
successful bidder under the Sheriff's Sale, orior to the severance of th1 
within matter below on April 12, 1976, for $50,000.00. 
Thus, the foregoing unimpeachable facts were obviously sufficient lee 
basis for Appellant's full participation below. Utah la~i. when applied ti 
said facts, renders the lower court's ruling in this resoect a material, 
prejudicial error, by virtue of these rules: 
"Persons having a joint interest shall be made parties ... When persm 
who are not indispensable, but who ought to be oarties if complete n 
lief is to be accorded ... the court shall order them summoned ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
Rule 19 (a) and (b), U.R.C.P. (Note: Use of the term "shall", indica 
this admonition is jurisdictional, not merely discretionary) 
" Parties may be dropped or added ... at any stage of the action. "(Our 
Rule 21, U.R.C.P. 
Additional authorities hold as follows on the subject: 
"Thus, it is declared that all persons who have a material interest 
the litigation, or who are legally or beneficially interested in 
the subject matter of the suit, and whose rights or interests are ~ 
to be concluded thereby, are necessary oarties." 
59 Am Jur 2d Parties, Section 12 
"The interest that a party must have in the subject matter of a sui: 
in order to be a necessary party thereto is a present, substantial 
interest, as distinguished from a mere exoectancy or future contin' 
interest." 
Green v. Grant, 143 Ill 61, 32 tlE 369 
In support of the rule see this Utah based case, in the federal cour 
Silver King Coalition ~ines Co. v. Silver Kina, etc. (CA 8 Utah) 2~ 
166 
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Based on said facts, outlined above, it is highly probable that Appell-
ant is not only "necessary", but is an indispensable party, according to 
these views: 
" In dispensable parties to an action are those whose interests in the 
subject matter are so interrelated, and would be so directly affected 
by the judgment, that a complete and equitable adjudication of the 
controversy cannot be made unless they are joined in the action." 
Foster v. Stewart, (La.) 161 So. 2d 334 
" A person is an indispensable party when the judgment to be rendered 
necessarily must affect his rights." 
Hartman Ranch Co. v. Assoc. Oil Co., 10 Cal 2d 232, 73 P2d 1163 
" For an absent person to be i ndi spensab le he must have a direct 
interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it 
cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit**, if the 
court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if 
the decree will have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if 
the final determination of the controversy in his absence will be 
inconsistent with equity and good conscience, he is an indispensable 
party." 
59 Am Jur 2d Parties, 361 (**.How can the joint interest in Parcel 12, 
Appellant and Ringwood, be separated and a full adjudication have taken 
place? We think this is impossible, particularly when defenses avail-
able to Appellant are likewise precluded by the lower court!) 
Cumlative to the foregoing is the question of whether Dr. Krofcheck's 
position as an original party defendant in the main action can be abrogated, 
although having a continuing interest in the subject matter (Parcel 12), 
by the severence technique employed herein. This authority comments on this 
aspect as follows: 
"Where all of the several oarties defendant joined in the action are 
proper parties, the right to dismiss, discontinue, or nonsuit as to 
one, or less than all, and to continue the action against the others, 
generally depends on whether all the named defendants are necessary 
parties to the action." (Emphasis added) 
24 Am Jur 2d 34, Section 41 
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POHlT II: APPELLANT LEGALLY MADE HIS APPEARANCE BELO\-/, \./HICH APPEARAflCE 
RECOGNIZED BY THE RECORD AND RESPONDENT. 
Although the specific ruling which has propelled this appeal involt 
whether Appellant is a proper party, the Respondent has, through prior 
argument to the court below, also claimed that Appellant did not in fac 
make a legal appearance in the proceedings below. However, Appellant's 
efforts in this regard started shortly after these proceedings were 
severed in April of 1976. 
In May, 1976, Appellant filed his motion for summary judgment, with 
extensive affidavits annexed thereto dealing directly with the subject 
matter of the action (Record: Pgs 35-50). Respondent opposed said moti~ 
by attempting to ameliorate the adverse facts described in Appellant's 
affidavits, with a counter-affidavit of one Gary A. Frank (Record: Pgs 
58-77). The legal effect of Appellant's said motion for summary judgmen 
clearly constitutes a general appea ranee in the severed proceedings bel 
according to this authority: 
"Inclusion in a motion ... of other than jurisdictional grounds may 
render an appearance general ... Motions of this character which have 
been held to have such result include motions .• for summary judgment 
(Emphasis added) 
6 CJS Appearances, Section 25 (b.) 
Thereafter, Appellant participated further in June, 1976, by filin~ 
his notice for hearing said summary judgment motion, which motion-notic 
was served on Respondent (Record: Pg 53) and the other parties. These 
actions, filing the motion in the first place and the notice afterward! 
constitute more than is minimumly required to establish a general aoo~ 
ance, as indicated by this rule: 
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'' ... if the attorney goes further and seeks in any way to participate 
in the case, an appearance is effectuated (Citing cases)" 
6 CJS Appearances, Section 21 
The record on appeal will further disclose that despite Appellant's effort 
to have his day in court, his motion and the other pending motions with 
hearings scheduled thereon were continued several times with the court 
below declining to rule thereon favoring instead a trial on the merits. 
Appellant's counsel appears throughout the file of this case as the 
attorney of record for Appellant; and, the other parties, including Respondent 
as well as the Court Clerk, continued to serve Appellant's counsel with the 
various pleadings and other documentation incident to this action, right up 
to trial (Statement Of Facts, supra.). 
Finally, if it should be argued that an effective severance has taken 
place barring Appellant's participation, consideration must be given to 
this rule: 
" Nor should a severance as to defendants be ordered where it wi 11 
deprive one of them of a substantial right or where the severance 
would not serve any useful purpose (Citing much authority)." 
1 CJS Actions, Section 119 {b) (2) 
POINT III: HAD APPELLANT BEEN PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE AT TRIAL, HE WOULD 
HAVE CONTINUED WITH HIS MERITORIOUS DEFENSE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF RESPONDENT'S 
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION AND ITS CASE-IN-CHIEF. 
In conjunction with the defenses of Richard W. Ringwood to the purported 
redemption of Parcel 12 by Respondent, as reffered to in the farmer's 
collateral appeal (Utah Supreme Court Number 15207), the Appellant herein 
was fully prepared to amplify his own defenses, that were clearly before 
13. 
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the lower court but never ruled on (Record: Pgs 35-50), had he been pen 
to do so at the trial of October 26, 1976, as follows: 
A. Respondent's Attorney's Lien Was 
Filed On Parcel 12 Long After The 
Lien Debtor's Interest Therein Ceased 
Facts set forth in the record on appeal, never challenged by Respon( 
anywhere in said record or at trial, disclose that just after Appellant' 
granter of Parcel 12 had title thereto partitioned and quieted, the oric 
lienor, William S. Richards, executed and recorded in 1971 quit claim & 
to said parcel, inter alia, just prior to the recording of Jl.ppellant's i 
to said land (Record: Pgs 35-36, Paragraphs 1-3). Thereafter, Warranty! 
were recorded from Park City Utah Corporation, the 1 ien debtor, to Appe· 
on October 22, 1971 (Record: Pg 25, Par. 19) covering Parcel 12 and othf 
property. 
Thus, after said debtor, under Respondent's attorney's lien, had bef 
fully divested of its interest in Parcel 12, said lien was then recorde1 
against Appellant's property over one year later, on November 15, 1972. 
(Record: Pgs 23, Paragraph 13; 80-82). 
Apparently William S. Richards, the original lienor under Responden: 
attorney's lien, thought his claim followed his debtor-client's real pn 
erty into Appellant's hands. Such is not the law in Utah, as shown by t 
recent (1972) case similar to the within cause (except, relating to a 
judgment for attorney's fees, which Respondent's claim is not) involvin 
land which had been sold by the attorney's lien debtor to others where~ 
the latter's land, as grantee, was held to be not liable under said lir 
as indicated in this decision: 
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11 The lien l'lhich this statute {78-51-41, U.C.A.) gives the attorney 
is upon his client's cause of action and/or judgment; and with res-
pect thereto he stands in no better position than his client. For 
the same reasons stated above, indicating that the nlaintiff's judg-
ment does not run against either [third party, in Apoellant's position], 
any lien the plaintiff's attorney may have thereon [the judgment] is 
likewise not effective against them [land conveyed to innocent third 
parties, file Appellant]." (Emphasis and brackets added) 
Lundeberg v. Dastrup, (Utah 1972) 497 P2d 648, @ page 650, second 
column. 
It is to be emphasized that said foregoing case (497 P2d 648) is making 
a particular limiting reference to that part of said statute (78-51-41, U.C.A.) 
which grants an attorney's lien on a judgment "in his client's favor and 
to the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they ir.ay come." 
Respondent's lien in question was of course never reduced to judgment 
(Record: Pgs 14-15) hence failing the criteria of Rule 69 (f) (1), U.R.C.P .. 
However, even if the same had been this Utah case seems to give priority to 
a valid deed, such as that by which Appellant acquired Parcel 12, predating 
said judgment, as follows: 
11 A judgment lien is subordinate and inferior to a deed which predated 
it whether recorded after such judgment or whether not recorded at all." 
Kartchner v. State Tax Comm., (Utah) 294 P2d 790 
Further to the rule expressed in Lundeberg (supra.) are these views in 
support thereof from other jurisdictions: 
" ... where an attorney recovering lands for his client failed to take 
steps to enforce his lien, or so to make the record that it would be 
notice to one whose duty it was to inquire, the lien \'lould not attach 
as against a purchaser for value after judgment without notice." 
Charles v. Whitt, 218 SW 994 
" ... if an attorney neglected to proceed to enforce his lien until a 
third person [such as Appellant] had in good faith, purchased the 
property recovered, he should be held to have waived his lien." 
Fillmore v. \•/ells, 15 P 343 
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" .... an attorney's charging lien covers onlv the interest of his c 
in the orooerty charaed, and is subject to any rights in the oro~ 
which are valid aaainst the client at the time the lien attaches. 
(Emphasis added) ~ 
In Re Gillasoie, (D.C.) 190 Fed. 88 
11 A statute conferrino a 1 ien should not be construed so as to imr 
the lien, by implication, on the property of one who is not resoor 
ble for the debt. 11 
53 C.J.S. 852 
"As a general rule a valid lien created on real or personal propeM 
is enforeceab 1 e against the property in the hands of any person wr 
sequently acquires it, exceot a bona fide urchaser for va 1 ue wi tr 
notice of the lien [Precisely the situation in Apoellant's case. 
(Emphasis and brackets added) 
53 C.J.S. 859 
It should be repeated that Apoel 1 ant was the owner of Parcel 12 ni 
only at the time Resoondent's lien notice was recorded, but was likew 
owner at the time of the Downey Bank foreclosure decree and sale here· 
which action Respondent relies upon for its redemotion effort. These 
circumstances are similarly analized in another judicial sale attemot 
redemption case (except the redeeming creditor's claim had been reduo 
to judgment), as follows: 
" ... Laws of 1917, p. 426, al lowing judgment creditors to redeem I 
sold on execution, the term 'judgment creditors' means judgment c 
of the person or persons whose lands are sold under execution, ~ 
have judgments or decrees capable of enforcement by a sale of the 
to be redeemed; and a judgment creditor of one who had no title t 
interest in the land could not redeem [i.e. creditor of Park City 
Corporation, Appellant's granter, can not redeem land sold to A~ 
Parcel 12]" (Emphasis and brackets added) 
Leach v. Torbert (Colo.) 204 P 334 
In Support of the rule: 
Exoarte !·/ood (ile\'t York) 4 Hill 542 
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Utah law clearly intends that conveyances such as the Parcel 12 
Harranty Deed to Appellant, recorded in October, 1971, (supra.), shall im-
part notice to the public, including Respondent, since the Richards lien 
purchaser-assignee (Respondent) "shall be deemed to purchase and take with 
notice" [Section 57-3-2, Utah Code Anno.] in view of Appellant's earlier 
recorded deed. 
The precision with which interpretations of said recording statute 
operate, is evident in the recent Utah case of Wilson v. Schneiter's 
Riverside Golf Course, 523 P2d 1226 where it was held that the "party who 
first recorded notice of ourchase prevailed" in a dispute over overlapping 
land descriptions. Given such hair-splitting as in that case, Appellant's 
factual basis can stand with complete impunity as to his priority against 
Respondent's too-late recording date for the subject attorney's lien. 
B. Respondent's Lien Clouding Title 
To Parcel 12, Partitioned in Civil No. 
4143, Was Illegally Based On Fees For 
Outside Lawsuits. 
Facts before the lower court, unchallenged by Respondent.disclose that 
Civil tlo. 4143, in the Summit County District Court, partitioned and quieted 
title of Parcel 12, inter alia, for which not more than $6,000.00 can be 
attributed to attorney fees, costs and expenses favoring William S. Richards, 
the original lienor, and his firm, against Appellant's granter (Record: Pg 
23; Paragraphs, 11, 12, 13). Further, the sum of $15,500.00 cash had been 
paid said Richards for application upon said lawsuit's fees subsequent to 
the attorney's lien filing of record (Record: Pg 25, Par. 18) thereby dis-
charging the said indebtedness incurred for Civil No. 4143 (Record: Page 
26, Par. 22; Pg 20) prior to the Downey Gank foreclosure herein. 
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Moreover, said attorney's lien notice as filed on November 15, 1971 
(Record: Pgs 80-82) purported to secure fees, costs and exoenses incurr 
by Appellant's granter relative to several other lawsuits (Civil Number 
4119, 4194, 4222, and 4275) none of which had been then adjudicated re. 
sulting in judgment, or otherwise. Of the $39,000.00 total attorney's I 
claim, approximately $33,000.00 thereof represented charges by the lier 
Wil 1 i am S. Richards and his firm, for fees and cos ts concerning matter: 
still unresolved outside the Civil No. 4143 suit which embraced Parcel 
(Record: Pg 24, Par. 17). The lo\'1er court files for the above-mentione1 
outside suits not only involved different issues, but there were many1 
parties joined with Appe 11 ant's granter who were not i nvo 1 ved with sai 
Civil No. 4143 action by which Parcel 12 was partitioned and thence ~ 
to Appellant, (Record: Pg 45, last sentence) 
The impropriety of lumping together a 11 fees, cos ts and expenses c 
various other lawsuits then under prosecution, and the involvement of 
different clients therein, with the Parcel 12-Civil No. 4143 action (t 
one having gone to judgment as of the date the Respondent's lien was f 
is illustrated by this fundamental doctrine of law: 
" •.. an attorney's charging lien extends ~ to fees and disburser 
rendered in the particular action in whicnthey were incurred, an1 
not cover a general balance due the attorney, or charges render~ 
other causes." (Emphasis added) 
97 ALR 1134, 1st Column, Par. 3, (citing over 100 cases, from all 
dictions) 
As indicated earlier in this brief, only Civil No. 4143 had gone· 
ment as of the Respondent's lien filing date, for which the $6,000.0C 
due and subseouently paid off before foreclosure and Respondent's our 
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thereof. The other suits were unresolved, and as of the date of this brief, 
the one requiring the greatest amount of Richards' time thereon, Civil No. 
4275, is still pending and untried in the court below. In any case, Richards 
and his law firm ceased as attorneys for Appellant's granter, and the latter's 
associates, before most of said remaining suits went to judgment or were 
even tried. From the decision of this Utah case the relevancy of such facts 
are discussed, resulting in an adverse ruling applicable to Respondent's 
lien position herein: 
"[3, 4] It is to be noted that the statute above set forth, [78-51-41, 
U.C.A.] gives to an attorney what is called a charging lien which 
attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his clients' 
favor and to the proceeds thereof. At the time of the order purportedly 
giving liens to the attorney, the plaintiff had no verdict, report, 
decision, nor judgment in his favor, and of course he had no proceeds 
therefrom. [Same facts as apolied to Appellant's granter and said other 
outside lawsuits]. The statute gives a lien to the attorney on the fruits 
of his labor so as to protect him against an unjust enrichment on the 
part of the non-paying client. It is not intended to give a general lien 
on any other assets of the clie~t." 
Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders (Utah 1968) 442 P 2d 940, second col. 
In support of that case see also: 
Bishop et al. v. Parker et. al. (Utah) 134 P 2d 180 
C. The Parcel 12 "Proceeds" From Civil 
No. 4143 Are Not Of A Type Which Can 
Be Subjected To Respondent's Attorney's 
Lien. 
The real property encompassed by the Civil Mo. 4143 action, including 
Parcel 12, upon which Resoondent's subject lien was filed, was not legally 
"recovered'', it was instead partitioned. The services of the Richards law 
firm in connection with said Civil No. 4143 suit were for defending and 
protecting Appellant's grantor's title to said property in the form of a 
19. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
partitioning suit. Hence, on sti 11 another ground the subject attorney' 
lien notice appears inva~id as shown by this authority: 
" In a majority of jurisdictions in which an attorney has a lien on 
specific property recovered, an attorney has no lien on property fo 
his services in successfully defending or protecting the title ther 
the mere protection or defense of the title not being considered a 
covery of the property involved." (Emphasis added) 
93 ALR 689, (b) 
Numerous cases from many other jurisdictions are cited under the fc 
rule, with the specificity of partitioning suits, comparable to Civil 1: 
included therein. Two of said cases are cited as: Gibson v. Buckner, 4l 
1034 and Gladney v. Rush, 56 SW 448. 
COtlCLUS ION 
Beyond Appellant's obvious position as a necessary party, having mi 
full and proper apoearance that was recognized by Respondent and the Co1 
Clerk, as well as Intervenor Ringwood, (POINTS I and II), the detailed 
elements relating to Respondent's lien's invalidity, ab initio, were c 
before the court below (POINT III) and constituted a basis for Appellr 
participation at trial, whic denied him. 
DATED thi ~day of_.._,_...Ao<;_.___1977. 
I I, 
I l 
.I I a 
Respectfully submitted, I 1 
SERVED the foregoing Aopellant's 
1/ I p 
DON R. STRONG, Attorney for 
Appe 11 ant, Joseph L. Krofd 'i w 
s/ DRS 
Brief this'71cJay of 19; j c 
d 
mailing two copies of the same, postage prepaid, to 
to Intervenor Richard W. Ringwood's counsel, at the addresses set for 
the cover of this brief. 
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APPENDIX B I 
[Resoondent' s prayer rrom its Comolaint
1 in Intervention, Civil ilo. 4473-A. The , 
Intervenor Pichard 'A. Rinc_iwood's orayer~ 
and Comolaint in Intervention, is similar, 
as qualified in the attached brief]. [ 
I 
I 
that Franklin D, Richards & Company is a redemptioner entitled to_ 
redeem the said Parcel 12 from the Sheriff's Sale and an issue 
exists between the Intervenors which must be resolved by the 
Court herein. 
WHEREFORE, the Intervenor, Franklin D. Richards & 
Company, prays for relief herein as follows: 
1. For an Order vacating the Order of October 2, 1974; 
denying the !1otion of the defendant, Joseph Krofcheck, in all 
1 particulars with prejudice and upon the merits, and adjudging 
that Intervenor, Franklin D. Richards & Company, is the owner in 
fee of the properties sold at the said Sheriff's Sale free and 
clear of any right, title or claim of any other party to this 
action. 
I 
i 
I 
\ 
I 
2, In the event the Court declines to grant the relief I 
sought by paragraph 1 herein or in ~he event orders favorable ' 
:o Intervenors in said matter be reversed on appeal, then the 
i In:ervenor, Franklin D, Richards & Company, prays for an Order 
and Decree adjudging that the Intervenor has a good and valid 
lien upon the properties purchased and redeemed by it to secure 
payn:ent of the s=s paid =or purchase of the properties, together 
with redemption fees, interest, reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs; providing for foreclosure of said lien; and ordering and 
directin6 the plaintiff herein, Dow::ey State Bank, to account 
1 
.':::ir ::oneys paid by the purc~asers at the Sheriff's Sale and to 
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~PDE!IO! X B 
(Second sheet) 
cake restitution of said sums to the Intervenor, Franklin D. 
Richards & Company, together with redemption fees, interest, 
attorney's fees and costs. 
3. For an Order adjudging that Intervenor, Franklin 
D. Richards & Company, has effected a valid and lawful redemp-
tion of Parcel 12 and is the owner of all interests acquired 
by Richard W. Ring-,.;ood as purchaser of said property at the 
~~eriff's Sale and directing the Sheriff of Summit County to 
e~ecute and deliver to said Franklin D, Richards & Company a 
good and sufficient Sheriff's Deed to said property. 
4. For costs of this action and for such other and 
~~rther relief as the Court may deem just and equitable in the 
premises, 
DATED this ~ day of December 19~. 
L \ MGLEY, CORNWALL & "''"'m"' 
By _j__\f'I '-.\._,,, . \ , ..__(\ '-'--
Grant, }!acfarlane, Jf :----,, 
Attorn~~s for Interv~nor, FrankL 
D. ~ichards & Co. "-.. · 
Suite 300, 141 East First Sout 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Copies of the foregoing Complaint in Intervention 
were mailed, postage prepaid, this 31st day of December 
l9E!._, to: 
George D. Melling, Jr., Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Dow:;ey State Sank 
800 Ccntinen~al Ba:J'.< Building 
Salt Lake City, Ut2~ 84101 
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Don R. S:rong, Esq. 
~PPENDI X S 
(Third sheet) 
Attorney for defendant Joseph 
L. Krofcheck 
197 South Main Street 
P. O. Eo::t 124 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
Attorney for Richard W. Ringwood 
455 South lbird East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Summi:: Co1..'!lty Sheriff 
County Courthouse 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
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